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Informed by William James’s and Paul Tillich’s respective understandings of mystical 
experiences, this essay will venture into contemporary epistemological debates on the nature of 
mystical experience. Over the past fourteen years of that debate, no less than seven articles 
focusing on mystical experience have marked the pages of the Journal of the American Academy 
of Religion, the most widely circulated religious studies periodical. In its critical-constructive 
work, this paper will ultimately offer an embodied model of such experience that attempts to 
mediate between two polar positions. 
Let me begin with a summary of the debate between those diametrically opposed construals, 
between essentialists and cultural-religious constructivists, the former maintaining a common, 
even sui generis, basis for mystical experience involving intimate contact with the divine. I will 
divide the essentialists into two camps: (1) those like W. T. Stace, Robert K. C. Forman, and 
Jonathan Shear who claim that some experiences are of immediate identity, undifferentiated 
unity, transcending completely the subject-object structure; (2) others, like Bernard McGinn, 
Moshe Idel, and Henry Simoni-Wastila, who counter that any mystical experience must have 
some object not identical with the mystical subject without remainder. This latter implies some 
mediation, though much of the normal mediation inherent in human consciousness may drop 
away.  
In their portrayals of immediate identity, Stace, Forman, and Shear emphasize the purity of 
mystical experience, that is, its contentless nature. It is an experience of nothing—no-thing—in 
particular, non-intentional in the sense of intending no object. Forman labels it a “pure 
consciousness event (PCE)” and Shear an “introspective mystical experience (IME).” Shear goes 
on to describe it “as devoid of phenomenological contents (sense perceptions, images, thoughts, 
emotions, sense of individual identity, etc.) whatsoever” (320). Earlier Stace wrote of “a kind of 
consciousness which has no objects,”  “without any empirical content” (82). Unlike these three 
thinkers, I would raise the possibility of our ordinary, everyday consciousness occasionally 
lacking focus on any particular object, thought, emotion, etc. Clearly, however, these essentialists 
intend something extraordinary about the nature of mystical experience. In his Journal of the 
American Academy of Religion piece, Forman does not commit himself to any one interpretation 
of awareness per se, of the “knowledge by identity,” of mystical experience:  the fact that “it is 
beyond all ordinary concepts and language, leaves it open to a virtually infinite range of theories, 
explanations, modes of expressions and descriptions” (727).  However, the mystics he cites 
consistently interpret this experience as one co-extensive with the ultimate reality behind all 
things. Following Stace, Shear sanctions bypassing the need for interpretation by positing an 
“extrovertive mystical experience (EME)” related to the introvertive, delineated as “awareness of 
this same empirically contentless, abstract, transcendental ‘reality’ as underlying every object in 
one’s experience, external (trees, the sky, etc.) as well as internal (thoughts, feelings, etc.)” (320).  
Unlike the proponents of undifferentiated unity, the other camp of essentialists stresses the 
metaphysical particularity and distinctness of finite human beings. Simoni-Wastila puts it this 
way: “Human beings, who by nature are finite and limited in their metaphysical boundaries, can 
never escape their particular natures. They cannot join with or become undifferentiated from 
God’s creative oneness, unity, and simplicity” (858). 
Thus, Simoni-Wastila, along with McGinn and Idel, maintain some necessary distinction 
between subject and object in mystical experience. In so doing, they stand with most modern 
philosophy since Hume and Kant in insisting that consciousness is always intentional, always of 
something. I note here that James’s model of perception of a wider consciousness normally 
subliminal to our consciousness falls under the category of mystical experience as involving an 
object rather than that of undifferentiated unity. 
Before leaving this discussion of the essentialists, allow me to complicate things further by 
introducing additional distinctions. Clearly the first camp posits an undifferentiated experience of 
identity of human and divine beyond the subject-object structure. Nevertheless, proponents of 
such experience typically do not hold that this experience encompasses all of God’s or the divine 
consciousness. Divine knowledge of the world represents a prime example of contents of 
consciousness that mystics typically do not claim. (Interestingly, Simoni-Wastila demurs from 
divine omniscience to ensure the “radical particularity” of creatures, contending that “God cannot 
know our heart of hearts” (860). While process theology strenuously rejects his opinion that “God 
cannot fully co–experience the feelings of others” (861), it does delay God’s all-inclusive 
knowledge of a creature’s experience till after the unit occasion has made its decision, lest God 
pantheistically determine that decision.) In a move towards monism, one way to handle this 
possible discrepancy, as in neo-Platonism and Advaita Hinduism, relegates divine knowledge of 
the world to lower knowledge. Nous (Greek, “mind”) knows the Platonic forms and the World 
Soul the material world, while Saguna Brahman comprehends the world according to Advaita 
Hinduism. The One of Plotinus or Advaita’s Nirguna Brahman remain unsullied by lower 
knowledge, experiencing only the higher knowledge of pure oneness, an experience the mystic 
believes she or he shares. While the devotee of unmediated identity traditionally holds that 
knowledge of the world drops away in mystical experience, another option is theoretically 
possible:  Just as the divine in the opinion of some has both the knowledge of pure oneness and of 
the world, one could maintain that the mystic at one and the same time has knowledge of 
undifferentiated unity with the divine at the highest level along with some ordinary consciousness 
of its being in the world.  
In fact, that is precisely Paul Tillich’s position. Therefore, Tillich’s thought has affinities with 
the camp of undifferentiated unity over against those who uphold some subject-object distinction. 
Tillich insists on that point of “identity” in all religious experience in his “doctrine” of the 
“mystical a priori” (23), whether that experience be a cultivated mystical state of substantial 
duration or not. On the other hand, Tillich’s posited experience of that which precedes the 
subject-object cleavage never constitutes the whole field of any moment of human awareness. 
Furthermore, a mediation of sorts always pertains:  in this life at least one never has an 
experience of unity beyond subject-object without something within the subject-object structure 
of the world becoming the vehicle or springboard for the experience. As I have argued elsewhere, 
visual art provided that springboard for Tillich personally (Nikkel, 2006b: 17-21). The raft 
metaphor from some forms of Eastern spirituality may help here: while the raft or object is 
necessary to get to the other side, one throws it away because it becomes irrelevant there. Because 
of the incidental nature of the specific content of the finite that occasions mystical identity and 
because it is distinct from the experience of identity, this experience maintains its “purity.” 
On the opposite side are constructivists like Steven Katz, Hans Penner, and Wayne 
Proudfoot, who maintain that no common core exists in mystical experiences, whether mediated 
or beyond all mediation. Rather, mystical experiences are wholly constructed by the mystic out of 
his or her own religious tradition. Note that the second group of essentialists above allows for 
some construction of the experience by the mystic, though crucially insisting on objective contact 
with the divine. One could label them as not simply essentialists but contextualists as well. 
“Constructivism,” as I refer to it, is thoroughgoing. Its assumption is both that there is no 
objective religious object that is mediated and that the strictly subjective constructions are unique 
to each mystic. Thus, either no mediated object internal to the mind obtains or, in the case of 
Proudfoot, an inchoate emotive-physiological state receives linguistic definition (see G. William 
Barnard on Proudfoot).   
Judging that the above brief overview will suffice for introducing the relatively clear-cut 
constructivist position, I will broach an additional option before critiquing constructivism. 
Simoni-Wastila, Martin T. Adam, and F. Samuel Brainard have recognized various efforts to find 
a third way to “mediate” the gap between essentialists and constructivists. Brainard notes the 
strategy of some, like Michael Sells on Western mysticism and Toshihiko Izutsu on Eastern 
mysticism, to acknowledge the similarity of mystical texts while bracketing the “ultimate” 
question of a common core (361-62). However, such skimming of the surface, so to speak, 
merely postpones rather than dissolves the question of a common core. Brainard favors a tertium 
quid of his own centering on the paradox of certain language about ecstatic experiences that both 
retains and collapses the subject-object scheme (385ff). Brainard’s proposed solution entails 
embracing the validity of “both-and” mystical experiences, where supposedly the subject-object/ 
nominalist–realist/ constructivist–essentialist distinctions are both upheld and transcended at the 
same time. Looming in the background is the ineffability of mystical experience, as Brainard 
assumes that language cannot get beyond an either-or answer to the question of these polarities. 
Though he does not find them promising, Brainard also mentions “no-pole (e.g., non-
foundational…) alternatives” (388). He includes “perhaps James’s pragmatism” here but says no 
more. Maybe Brainard alludes to James’s theory of pure experience where subject-object are 
blended at the most fundamental level. This theory might dissolve the paradox of mystical 
experience through its analogy to (a basic level) of ordinary experience. Yet this model of 
perception does involve contents and ultimately (further or greater) objectification. Or perhaps 
Brainard simply alludes to James’s belief that moral fruitfulness constitutes one test of a mystical 
experience’s validity. James, however, has much more to say on the matter and believes overall in 
the objective truth of mystical experience. Finally Brainard mentions (388) and Adam describes a 
“family resemblance” approach: “mak[ing] no ontological claims… It acknowledges family 
resemblances among the diversity of experiences called ‘mystical’ while at the same time picking 
out for examination subsets of experiences having similar descriptions” (813). As with the 
approach of noting textual similarities, though, this approach just postpones or ignores the 
ultimate issue: Are mystical experiences just constructed from traditions by individuals or is there 
a common core—or perhaps several common cores—behind them?  
Brainard’s proffered solution represents the most interesting of these various middle ways, so 
I will address it separately. Its plausibility rests on the truth that any experience with non-
linguistic elements can never be fully expressed through language—so how much more might 
that be the case with an ultimate experience of ultimate reality. 
Yet, if we can bother to verbalize about mystical experience at all, I would insist that we 
could say something about the manner and the extent to which it transcends or blurs and to which 
it retains the subject-object distinction. The fact that mystics’ own linguistic interpretations of 
their experiences disagree on whether and to what extent this distinction remains, while belying 
any easy consensus on the matter, at least supports the possibility of saying something relevant. 
Likewise, I would insist that we can say something about whether mystical experiences are 
wholly constructed by the subject or have some “objective” reality behind them. Brainard agrees 
with what James labeled the “noetic” quality of mystical experience, that the mystic believes he 
or she is in touch with some reality. But Brainard’s apparent contentment with leaving it there, 
declining to verbalize about the nature of that reality, strikes me as a cop-out. A constructivist 
would certainly feel no challenge to take mystical experiences seriously on those terms—or lack 
thereof. 
The fundamental weakness of these above attempts at a tertium quid is this: they do not help 
to resolve the debate unless and until they address what, if anything, is mediated—or 
unmediated—in mystical experience. This brings us back to the question of a common core. 
Common sense seems to cry out for some common or similar core(s) to mystical experiences. 
Very similar descriptions of experiences of pure consciousness beyond subject-object cut across 
various traditions, as do depictions of mystical experiences of divine love. Furthermore, beyond 
anecdotal evidence of the physiology and mental functioning of meditative adepts, earlier 
scientific studies monitored the autonomic nervous system (through pulse and blood pressure 
measurements) and brain wave patterns (using electroencephalography [EEG]) during meditation 
while contemporary scholars like Eugene d’Aquili and Andrew Newberg have imaged 
neurological patterns in brain activity common to mystical states. 
Let me summarize the scientific findings thus far. At least four brain areas appear relevant to 
mystical experiences:  the thalamus (involved in integrative and non-specific functions), the 
limbic system (involved with emotions), parts of the pre-frontal cortex, and the posterior sections 
of the parietal lobes. These latter two areas have the most prominent roles in mystical 
experiences. The posterior parietal lobes house what Newberg terms “the Orientation Association 
Area (OAA)” (2002). More specifically the left lobe provides a spatial sense of self, while the 
right defines the physical space in which the self interacts. The pre-frontal cortex contains “the 
Attention Association Area (AAA),” which focuses attention on intentional or goal-directed 
thought, actions, and behavior (Newberg, 2002). In particular, parts of the pre-frontal cortex show 
elevated activity during thinking about or acting on social relationships (Monastersky). How do 
cognitive neuroscientists learn what happens in the relevant parts of the brain during meditative 
and other states? Able to expand upon general conclusions from EEG studies, functional 
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) detects blood flow, while positron emission tomography 
(PET) and single photon emission computed tomography (SPECT) can also monitor metabolism 
and some neurotransmitter activity. 
While other areas of the brain undoubtedly also play a role in our sense of self, as suggested 
earlier the posterior parietal lobes figure crucially. D’Aquili and Newberg coined the phrase “the 
Unitary Continuum” to refer to the degree of connectedness to others—or to put it conversely 
how sharply the self is defined over against others—in various human experiences. On the “less 
connectedness” side of baseline fall some pathological conditions, including depression. On the 
extreme of the “more connectedness” side falls what they identify as “Absolute Unitary Being.” 
Newberg describes this state as one “where there is no perception of spatial or temporal 
boundaries whatsoever, accompanied by the experience of absolute unity, devoid of content and 
with even the self-other dichotomy obliterated” (2002). D’Aquili and Newberg’s familiarity with 
the model of undifferentiated identity of one essentialist camp is unmistakable. Neurological 
studies so far have not been so precise as to distinguish definitively between reported experiences 
of undifferentiated unity versus those of a unity of love versus those of “cosmic consciousness,” 
as Newberg cites the well-known experience of Richard Bucke of the universe as a living 
consciousness even as individuals retain their individuality (2002). Nevertheless, neuro-studies 
yield a consensus on reduced activity in the posterior parietal lobes during meditative and 
contemplative states, pointing to a diminished sense of self vis-à-vis others or, put positively, a 
greater sense of connectedness and unity with others. 
Inversely the studies generally show increased activity in parts of the pre-frontal cortex, 
apparently corresponding to focusing on relationships with others. In experiences of 
undifferentiated unity, we seem to find enhanced focus but not on any object in particular. Studies 
of the autonomic nervous system, as summarized by Newberg, support the existence of this 
paradoxical condition. Some studies have associated meditation with a relaxed state where the 
parasympathetic nervous system kicks in and lowers heart and respiratory rates, blood pressure, 
and metabolism—this would be the common wisdom.  Other studies have suggested a more 
complex picture of meditative states: heightened activity of the parasympathetic nervous system 
can happen at the same time as heightened activity of the sympathetic nervous system, the system 
associated with arousal (increased variability of heart rate is one sign of this). As Newberg notes, 
this “fits characteristic descriptions of meditative states in which there is a sense of overwhelming 
calmness as well as significant alertness” (2006).  
When we move from physiological and neurological studies to a purported genetic basis for 
the sense of spiritual connection, we slide on thinner ice.  I share with most other participants in 
the religion and science dialogue some skepticism about Dean Hamer’s assertion of a “God 
gene.” While he does acknowledge the influence of culture and more personal environment on 
individuals’ spirituality, his precise claim that genes account for half of the variations in degree of 
spirituality strikes me and others as too quantitative and reductive for such a complex dimension 
of human life. Despite my caveat, Hamer may be on to something regarding human tendencies to 
construct a sharp sense of self versus tendencies to feel connected to wider realities, which would 
have obvious implications for mystical experiences. Specifically a variation of the gene VMAT2 
in some individuals allows for greater dopamine, serotonin, and noradrenaline effects, apparently 
on the pre-frontal area associated with relationships with others. This suggests that some persons 
have a stronger proclivity towards unitive experiences than others. In general, this thesis 
harmonizes with a 2002 neurological study cited by Newberg, indicating increased dopamine 
activity “during meditation related practices” (2006). In an interesting negative example, 
decreased activity in this area seems to be associated with a decreased sense of connection with 
others: a 1994 study showed decreased glucose metabolism in murderers (Newberg, 2002). 
Thus, both common sense and diverse scientific studies point to some common or similar 
core(s) to mystical experience. Yet the constructivist position, presented by Stephen Katz in his 
1978 Mysticism and Philosophical Analysis that launched the current debate, defies such apparent 
common sense and scientific research. Hans Penner probably has stated these constructivist 
ramifications most bluntly: “…mysticism now covers a host of beliefs and experiences which 
have no relation to each other whatsoever.” As Martin Adam has aptly observed regarding the 
Kantian perspective in which Katz understands himself to stand, a peculiarity emerges: for Katz 
no particular data or object is present in mystical experience to interpret—the concepts of the 
mystic’s tradition are wholly determinative; so everything is interpretation but ironically nothing 
pushes back on us calling for interpretation. For Kant, noumena—objects in themselves—are 
never experienced; rather one experiences the appearances of the object, namely, phenomena. For 
Kant, though, we perforce unconsciously interpret objects through basic categories like space and 
time. The conscious concepts of religious traditions constitute another layer of interpretation. 
However, as Adam notes, not only the constructivists but some essentialists as well conflate the 
two types of interpretation, usually by reducing all interpretation to the more or less conscious 
conceptual level (804ff.).   
Not surprisingly, Katz finds the strongest support for his position of interpretation all the way 
down in the difference between claimed experiences of undifferentiated unity versus those where 
some distinction remains between subject and object: There is no intelligible way that anyone can 
legitimately argue that a “no-self” experience of “empty” calm is the same experience of intense, 
loving, intimate relationship between two substantial selves, one of whom is conceived as the 
personal God of western religion and all that this entails (39-40). 
Obviously my structuring of this article recognizes the validity and importance of this 
distinction. However, noting a distinction between two basic types of experience as conceptually 
interpreted—and perhaps difference on the experiential level of the degree to which a sense of 
self abides or departs—hardly denies the possibility of similarities or common core(s) to mystical 
experiences. 
We have seen the irony of the constructivist premise of no noumena or proto-object to 
interpret—or at least nothing that constrains interpretation. In a further irony, the constructivists 
end up with a position regarding the issue of mediation similar to those who tout undifferentiated 
identity, for both maintain the strictly content-less nature of whatever, if anything, the mystic 
experiences prior to interpretation. Of course, these latter essentialists hold that pure, content-less, 
unmediated experiences occur apart from interpretation afterwards. But for the former, 
experiences lack content save for the mystic’s conceptual constructs; from an opposite direction 
mediation is absent, for again nothing exists—no object—to mediate, or at most an utterly 
inchoate and content–less emotive–physiological state. 
Speaking of mediation, the contemporary consensus accepts the mediated nature of ordinary 
consciousness and experience. Before proceeding further in the tasks of tackling critically and 
constructively mystical experience and mediation, I will introduce my perspective of “radical 
embodiment,” wherein everyday consciousness is radically mediated by the body, indeed rooted 
in the body, substantively as well as instrumentally. Elsewhere, I argue that even our linguistic 
experience always builds and relies upon our sensorimotor orientation to and action in the world 
(Nikkel, 2006a). Human consciousness is embodied consciousness that evolved biologically for 
the sake of the organism. Neuroscientists Antonio Damasio and Gerald Edelman theorize that 
consciousness arises through brain mappings of one’s body in correlation to the environment. As 
suggested earlier, while mappings in the posterior parietal lobes appear to play an especially 
significant role in spatial orientation, many parts of the brain figure in our sense of self. Indeed, 
for Damasio and Edelman, every perceptual sense involves mappings of our bodies in relation to 
the environment. Both scientists conclude that all mammals have a “basic” or “proto” 
consciousness that distinguishes self from others and the environment. Only humans have a 
higher consciousness that entails the ability through language to objectify and reflect upon our 
sense of self. Damasio in particular focuses on emotions or feelings as integral to the sense of 
self. Emotions are first of all about the body and its state—though usually involving some direct 
or indirect relationship to the social or natural environment. I find especially helpful Damasio’s 
notion of “background body feelings”: in addition to stronger feelings of, say, sadness or joy, we 
do have feelings about the state of various parts of our body, not only on the surface or near 
surface areas but also with respect to our viscera. It is no coincidence for Damasio that “how do 
you feel?” is a common question of greeting. For persons with an integral sense of bodily 
consciousness, we immediately become aware of a pain say in our big toe because of this 
constant monitory awareness. These background body feelings, normally peripheral to our focal 
consciousness, still inescapably color all our ordinary conscious experience. The embodied 
reality, for example, of a mouse or a dolphin means that the color or tone of its experience will 
differ somewhat from ours.   
Now we are ready to proceed further in considering mediation and mystical experience. I will 
examine in turn three types of experiences: (1) the most radical: an experience of the divine, 
circumscribed both as to the number of participants and in time, where all sense of ordinary 
subject-object consciousness drops away; (2) the Tillichian model with its ubiquitous immediate 
experience of the divine beyond subject-object, albeit usually in the background, always 
accompanied by some subject-object consciousness; (3) the Jamesian model where some 
distinction between human subject and divine object remains at every point. 
I can think of two models for the first type, radical and exclusionary in the sense that subject-
object consciousness completely rescinds. Of course, any serious scholar within the academy or a 
major world religion acknowledges that normal consciousness always correlates with neural 
activity. Nevertheless, at least a few dualists regard this correlation as metaphysically incidental 
and inessential (for example, Eccles). This position is compatible with the further theory that 
when the subject-object component of consciousness, correlated with brain activity, fades away, 
pure consciousness, divine consciousness, the deeper essence of consciousness unmediated by 
any neural activity, remains. Whether or not anyone today explicitly advocates this theory, it does 
accord with some traditional mystical philosophy in at least Advaita Hinduism and Theravada 
and Mind–Only Buddhism. 
A more plausible model, however, holds that the brain does mediate an experience of identity 
with the divine completely transcending subject-object consciousness. This model, in keeping 
with the results of neuroscientific research, grants that various parts of the brain involved in 
ordinary consciousness differentiate or become quiescent. Note what this model entails:  those 
mediating parts of the brain are utterly transparent to this pure divine consciousness.  Though 
normally involved in subject-object consciousness, they do not color or filter this experience. 
Background body feelings, referred to earlier, in no way impinge on this state of consciousness. 
That one may achieve absolute knowledge unmediated by human language, culture, tradition, and 
bodies I regard as an Enlightenment conceit. Or more precisely, the conceit assumes that such 
human mediators have no effect on our knowledge—it assumes their absolute transparency to 
their object. (Unwittingly some radical postmodernists or poststructuralists end up replicating the 
error of the incidental nature of these human mediators through an unbridled constructivism, 
though now there is no concrete object to reach [Nikkel, forthcoming].)  
To say more about inductive evidence that mediation affects all human knowledge is beyond 
the scope of this article. I concede the theoretical or logical possibility of the complete 
transparency of some human brains to a divine consciousness beyond subject-object. But I would 
note that the supporters of this model carve out an exception to the way the brain otherwise 
functions in knowing—albeit this alleged pure consciousness is an exceptional state. One does 
not need to be convinced as I am that mediation makes a difference in all knowledge to judge this 
model negatively. Those taking embodiment or evolutionary biology/ neuroscience seriously will 
likely find it implausible as well. For if our brains evolved in conjunction with our bodies as 
biological organisms, the evolution of brain structures able to function as a transparent conduit to 
a divine consciousness seems improbable.  
I will now consider the second scenario where an experience of undifferentiated unity with 
the divine constitutes only part of one’s total experience or awareness. As one reader of the 
proposal for a version of this essay put it, one may have a mystical experience even as “the bodily 
feelings… just inevitably come along for the ride.” Indeed, Tillich’s “mediated, unmediated” 
experience of the ultimate falls precisely under this hybrid category: humans have an awareness 
of ultimacy beyond the subject-object cleavage that never constitutes their total awareness at any 
moment. Tillich’s mystical a priori always combines with an a posteriori, in a kind of synthesis 
reminiscent of Kantian epistemology. The pure experience of the divine makes up part of an 
“impure” total experience. Before directly addressing the problem of mediation, I will note a 
radical aspect of Tillich’s model. Unlike the first model, everybody has a mystical awareness as a 
component of every experience—or at least every human of a certain age with normal 
capabilities. But why stop there? Might not any animal with some awareness or consciousness 
have such an experience? As the prius of all subject-object relations, logical consistency would 
seem to demand that, if one type of sentient creature experiences the divine, all do. Obviously a 
mouse or lizard could not conceptualize or interpret its experience of the mystical a priori. This 
fact points to an interesting issue: while Tillich characterizes the identity beyond subject-object as 
contentless, this awareness is associated with a sense of the unconditional nature of this divine 
reality. This awareness has clear parallels, in a Romantic intuitionist vein, to Schleiermacher’s 
“feeling of absolute dependence.” While this kind of awareness strikes one as more general than 
particular or specific, one could well regard it as a type of content rather than strictly content-less. 
The question arises: Does a feeling of unconditionedness or of absolute dependence occur as part 
and parcel of the experience, or is it an interpretation or (at least proto–) conceptualization, albeit 
intuitive? Since for Tillich the mystical a priori comes with every human experience even though 
we might fail to consciously recognize it—and by extension probably with every creaturely 
experience, I conclude that this sense of unconditionedness involves some interpretation. 
Admittedly the above has been something of an excursion. But I will now cut to the chase. 
What, if anything, mediates this universal awareness of the divine? We could hypothesize that the 
mystical a priori simply bypasses our brains, as we first did with the exclusionary or unmixed 
experience of identity beyond subject-object. However, for Tillichian thought, a theologically 
fatal objection arises:  This alternative more than smacks of the “supranaturalism” anathema to 
Tillich. (Though at least in this case of a universal mystical a priori sans bodily mediation, the 
supranaturalism would be built into the structure or “pre-structure” of the universe rather than 
constitute an occasional intervention.) 
The second possibility, again paralleling our consideration of the unmixed experience, is that 
our brains mediate the mystical a priori—human brains and mouse brains—although, in the latter 
case no conceptualization could ensue. Yet to uphold the crucial element of transcendence of the 
subject-object structure, this mediation must be completely transparent, as with the exclusionary 
model. We must imagine then that the brains of all sentient creatures evolved so as to allow this 
transparency. While theoretically possible, this seems much more implausible than the notion that 
only human brains happened to so evolve.   
The reader for whom my above arguments and assumptions resonate will grant the 
improbability of mystical experience with no mediation or transparent mediation, where all sense 
of subject and object vanishes. Yet what of those mystical experiences, perhaps involving some 
images and/or some emotions, perhaps involving a profound sense of divine love, where some 
distinction between subject and object remains, even though much of the usual sense of 
separation has evaporated? William James postulates a mystical experience involving our 
perception of supernatural mind(s). His use of “perception” is significant for it entails some 
retention of a subject-object structure. Still this perception is rather direct. Our subjectivity 
remains and our brains still operate, though in an unaccustomed way, but the fence at the margins 
of our consciousness comes down, allowing us to experience the consciousness of another, which 
is normally subliminal to us. This supernatural consciousness of which we become aware does 
itself lie within the subject-object realm and thus has contents. However, our awareness of it lacks 
specific knowledge of the contents. It is somewhat analogous to the memory we sometimes have 
of a dream where all the details have vanished. (Interestingly, James regarded several of his 
dreams as such an awareness of supernatural consciousness.) Having outlined James’s postulation 
of direct human perception of a supernatural mind when the fence confining our ordinary 
consciousness comes down, I now raise the critical question of whether this model squares with 
his understanding of consciousness as a psychological and biological process. James himself 
would see this as a legitimate question, as he regards all experiences as instantiations of these 
processes. 
James’s delineation of consciousness as a flowing activity is still standard in the field of 
psychology. He noted both consciousness’s orientation to the general environment or “streaming 
array” as well as its recognition of particulars that satisfy biological needs or drives. James’s most 
basic theory of consciousness, therefore, acknowledges its entailment of a subject aware of its 
environment and of objects, some of the latter of which may be subjects in their own right. Since 
James does not endorse undifferentiated unity, we have a preliminary consistency with respect to 
his model of mystical experience. While James obviously did not possess today’s knowledge of 
evolutionary development and neuroscience, he did uphold the evolutionary adaptiveness of 
consciousness along with its biological nature. So how might subliminal awareness of other 
consciousnesses that occasionally becomes direct fit into James’s scheme? James of course just 
dealt with human awareness of other consciousnesses, but I see no reason why it should not apply 
to other animals given his assumptions. If awareness of other consciousnesses were both specific 
and under the organism’s control, the survival advantage for some creatures is apparent: for 
example, a mouse would find it most helpful to know of Tabby’s intention to pounce. 
Unfortunately, as we have seen, such awareness normally lacks specificity. (Exceptions for James 
include automatic writing and mediumship where deceased human spirits might transmit a 
particular message.) Also unfortunately, the subliminal does not come into direct awareness 
whenever it would benefit the organism.  
In addition, as with Tillich’s mystical a priori, awareness of a supernatural consciousness 
would not prove beneficial to a non-human animal unable to interpret or conceptualize it. 
Furthermore, according to James these experiences sometimes prove negative due to the 
psychological make-up of the experient and/or possibly due to the evil intentions of a 
supernatural consciousness.  
Thus, our discussion of the biological adaptiveness of mystical and related extraordinary 
experiences on James’s model ends in ambiguity. More daunting, however, as with experiences 
of undifferentiated identity, is the question of mechanism. What perceptual sense or combination 
of senses—or any aspect of the body and the brain, however intuitive—inputs these other 
consciousnesses? To my knowledge James did not address this issue. Neo-pragmatist William 
Dean, however, has. Given that the five senses are “in abeyance” (James, 1902:424), Dean 
characterizes this direct perception as a bodily “non-sensuous perception.” Further, he claims that 
in general “what the body receives is mostly non-conscious, indefinite, and neither transmittable 
to nor translatable by the senses or cognition” (8). I agree with the non-conscious nature of most 
of what our bodies input and would add that the bulk of what contributes to our explicit 
knowledge is subconscious, tacit, and indefinite—explicit cognition forming the tip of the 
iceberg. The controversial— indeed if my intuition is correct—dubious, part concerns the 
assertion that we receive input from outside our bodies not transmitted through our five senses 
that contributes to cognition—in this case cognition of a divine consciousness. Granted the jury is 
still out on at least one type of extraordinary sense perception, namely, whether people can detect 
at a rate greater than chance when they are being observed by another without any direct 
perceptual signals. That leaves us, however, with a dearth of empirical evidence of extraordinary 
cognition of the consciousness of another.  
Moreover, the lack of any candidates from contemporary scientific knowledge for the 
mediation of such experiences of the contents of other consciousnesses definitely counts against 
the plausibility of James’s model—and probably against other models—of mystical experience 
where some distinction between human subject and divine object remains. On the face of it, this 
rather direct transmission of the mental contents of one being to another appears more immaterial 
or idealistic than bodily. Finally, one could resort to a supernaturalism tailored to mystical 
experience where some subject-object distinction abides: God miraculously works on the brains 
of mystics to induce whatever experiences God desires, but leaves no physical evidence of this 
divine action in the external environment. This would contradict Jamesian metaphysics, however, 
where even “supernatural” forces act within the laws and processes of the universe in the broadest 
sense. 
James appended to his basic psychological model of consciousness a theory of perception as 
“pure experience” of a datum combining subject and object, which we then sharpen into a clear 
subject-object distinction. This theory does not insist on a complete absence of distinction 
between subject and object in the earliest moments of perception. However, it does uphold a 
much greater unity of subject and object than we find in finished perception and experience. The 
sharing of the phrase “pure experience” with many mystics and scholarly proponents of 
undifferentiated unity is suggestive. If true, this theory of perception would increase the 
plausibility of direct experience of the supernatural. Unfortunately the whole thrust of 
evolutionary biology in general, of the neurobiological theories of Damasio and Edelman in 
particular, and of neuroscientific evidence thus far indicate that consciousness evolved through 
the plotting of changes in the (relatively homeostatic) body with respect to changes in the 
environment. As suggested earlier, our brains– map what occurs in our bodies, what occurs in our 
environment, and the correlations between the two. This is to say that a subject-object distinction 
enters on the ground floor of conscious perception (indeed built upon preconscious processes of 
correlative representations of environment and organism). 
Before advancing to my own constructive work on the nature of mystical experience, I want 
to address a common argument for the reality of mystical experiences of either the 
undifferentiated or differentiated kind:  the sense of the reality of the object or of that which 
transcends subject-object by many mystical experients. Newberg, though not a philosopher or 
theologian, addresses this issue from a so-called “neuroepistemological” perspective. He cites 
three criteria by which the brain might judge an experience as real:  “the subjective vivid sense of 
reality,” “duration through time,” and “agreement intersubjectively as to what is real,” but 
concludes that the latter two collapse into the first (2006). I judge that he dismisses duration and 
inter–subjective agreement much too quickly. He gainsays the former by noting that the brain 
structures one’s sense of time, with certain brain injuries distorting one’s perception of time while 
some mystics experience no sense of time or duration at all. Yet we do have more, objective 
scientific evidence that time in any given spatiotemporal frame of reference passes at the same 
rate whatever our subjective experiences. On the latter, while undoubtedly some more or less 
instant neurological criteria exist that enable us to consider some experiences and not others as 
candidates for “reality,” inter–subjective agreement constitutes a powerful tool to judge the 
reality of experiences called into question. Thus I conclude that a subjective sense of reality does 
not succeed as a strong argument for the reality of their object/“non-object.” 
From the above, I obviously part company with both camps of essentialists. Yet, as suggested 
earlier, both reports of mystical experiences and scientific research point to some experiential and 
physiological-neurological common core to most mystical experiences, both more emotive-
imagist and “purer” ones. I propose that the mystical object is not an “external” supernatural one, 
but more internal to our embodied consciousness. But what mediates what in mystical 
experience? Larry Short makes a good start in theorizing that the mediation in mystical 
experience is non-linguistic (though of course describing the experience afterwards entails 
linguistic mediation) (664ff). Barnard also admits the reality of “pre-linguistic” or “trans-
linguistic” experience. Larry Short suggests that any experience involving “an interruption in the 
movement from signifier to signified,” where we “get hung up in between”—in other words 
involving consciousness but not of any particular object, and which takes on religious meaning is 
mystical (668ff). This strikes me, though, as insufficiently specific. Brief, indeed momentary, 
everyday experiences where one loses awareness of object or signified would not usually, if ever, 
incorporate a diminished sense of self let alone unity with some larger reality. Mystical 
experiences by contrast, usually cultivated and relatively sustained, do entail a change in sense of 
self. Some have hypothesized that all religious experiences involve cross-modal translations of 
various perceptual senses, thus promoting a unitive feeling (e.g., Winkelman). However, in many 
mystical experiences the senses do seem to be in abeyance. Amy Hollywood in her recent book, 
Sensible Ecstasy, highlights the frequent employment of erotic images and language in the 
descriptions of medieval mystics and recommends the cultivation of diverse forms of sensual 
experience. Previously Jeffrey Kripal authored Roads of Excess, Palaces of Wisdom:  Eroticism 
and Reflexivity in the Study of Mysticism. In that work he notes that erotic love in general 
diminishes the sense of a separate self as it increases the sense of unity with another (12). 
However, I would note crucial dissimilarities of ordinary erotic experiences from mystical ones: 
in human sexual experiences pronounced physiological changes occur in certain parts of the body 
and the brain, while the one with whom one unites is a particular finite individual. With respect to 
the brain, Newberg notes similarities between orgasmic and unitive states, but also significant 
differences: the hypothalamus appears to play a more prominent role in sexual climax, while 
cortical frontal lobes take a more active role in mystical states (Horgan). In Sacred Pain:  Hurting 
the Body for the Sake of the Soul, Ariel Glucklich considers the role of pain in stimulating certain 
religious experiences. Glucklich argues that pain can break down the sense of self, thus opening 
one up to a sense of unity with the sacred (e.g., 207). Without disagreeing with that assessment, I 
would observe that pain bears no necessary or unique relationship to mystical experience. On the 
one hand, overwhelming pain sometimes simply dissolves the sense of an integrated self, leaving 
one incapable of reintegration with a larger reality or meaning. On the other hand, most mystical 
experiences have not involved pain as a method to achieve greater unity.   
The above theories on mystical experience have the advantage of highlighting our embodied 
nature.  Except for Short’s account, they rightly highlight a lessened sense of a distinctive self to 
the benefit of a greater sense of unity with the other as crucial to mystical experience. I will 
advance an embodied version of mystical experiences wider in some ways than any of those 
accounts, yet still circumscribed:  its object is not as definite as in cross-modal or erotic 
experiences, nor is pain a necessary preliminary object, yet its content differs in kind from any 
mundane experience where one momentarily loses awareness of any particular object. Mystical 
experiences consist of a distinctive sense of bodily harmony conjoined with a general openness to 
the potentialities of an integrated environment—thus their expansive and unitive quality. A 
lessening of the sense of one’s self as simply separate and distinct from others and a concomitant 
upsurge in the sense that one forms part of a larger reality along with other particular realities 
constitute a key part of the distinctive quality of this type of experience or state.  This state 
involves distinctive neurological processes, referred to earlier, about which our scientific 
knowledge continues to grow. Such experiences may be, and historically sometimes—indeed 
often—have been, interpreted as escape from our world to an otherworldly reality. But a better 
interpretation is available: the special sense of openness to unity with an other typical of mystical 
experiences conduces to a deep sense of harmony and empathy with our fellow human beings, 
other living creatures, as well as with the supernatural ultimate of the world’s religions.   
Before concluding, let me review and summarize the reasons and arguments I cited against 
the essentialist positions: Human (and other animals’) bodies and brains evolved in order that 
biological organisms might flourish in natural (and social) environments. This entailed some 
distinction between subject and object on the ground floor of sentience or consciousness. While 
one cannot rule out a priori the possibility of human or other animal brain structures evolving 
with a transparency to the divine consciousness, this is unlikely given the more “translucent” 
mediation of object by subject that pervades conscious life. Regarding essentialists who maintain 
some distinction between mystic and the divine, implausibility lies in the empirical lack both of 
identifiable brain structures or mechanisms to tap into the divine consciousness and of evidence 
that organisms gain awareness of the consciousness of other organisms apart from perceptions 
and reflection upon these. What of the mystic advocating unmediated identity who claims that the 
reduced sense of distinction of self from other that I posit in mystical experiences can reach the 
point where sense of self somehow disappears and even that what remains is precisely divine 
consciousnesss? I would first refer back to the general non-reliability of subjective certainty in 
such matters. More particularly, I would suggest that the mystic is probably misreading her or his 
experience, given what we know about the nature of human and animal consciousness. 
Undoubtedly for some, my denial of unmediated or direct connection with the divine 
concedes game, set, and match to the constructivists. Yet given other reasons discernible from our 
bodily being in the world that validate the truth of the purposive interconnection of all life within 
the span of such an ultimate reality, why should we not value mystical experiences so interpreted? 
After all, epistemologically speaking, James and Tillich both hold that mystical experiences never 
yield specific information about the divine: Tillich because of his espousal of the universal 
mystical a priori and James because we finally cognize only a holistic sense of the co-conscious 
enveloping supernatural rather than any particulars. And, of course, James’s pragmatic concern 
with moral fruitfulness invites us to value mystical experiences whatever their ultimate cognitive 
status. We no longer live in or under the influence of a Romantic age that assumed a direct 
connection with the divine at the level of intuition or feeling. But the varieties of mystical 
experience that captivated William James and Paul Tillich may stimulate us to imagine more 
bodily connections with the divine for a postmodern age. 
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